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Abstract
This paper explores the limits of the frame “disinformation” when exploring the growing industry
of pseudonymous influencers who occasionally campaign for politicians and seed crisis frames.
Pseudonymous influencers in the form of parody accounts, meme pages, and romantic love
quotes (hugot) accounts, and horny queer "alt" accounts have been able to evade disinformation
interventions such as fact-checking because their media manipulation objectives are less focused
on spreading false news and more directed toward signal boosting politically-slanted hashtags or
promoting electioneering politicians. By mapping a diverse ecosystem of pseudonymous
influencers in the Philippines, our paper contributes an important global South case study to
understand the political economy of disinformation and the complicities of influencer industries
with disinformation and “dark PR” (Edwards, 2021).
Introduction
Popular journalism about the Philippines’ disinformation crisis has often narrowly attributed
“fake news” to President Rodrigo Duterte, the Marcos family, and a small but influential army of
social media bloggers (Syjuco, 2017). Many online celebrities have indeed amassed thousands of
followers by amplifying Duterte’s angry populist rhetoric (Curato, 2016) and rallying supporters
to embrace a political identity of being part of Duterte’s army, known as the “Duterte Death
Squad” (DDS) (Gutierrez, 2017). Some these journalistic reports and academic research have
overstated the impact of these supporters on the political process, at times even expressing
deterministic claims they were secret weapons for Duterte’s electoral victory in 2016 (e.g., Etter,
2017). Senate investigations in past years have pinned the problem of “fake news” on online
influencers (Tan, 2017), and social media platforms eventually tried to minimize their reach in
their News Feed (Rappler.com, 2020). While investigating mega-influencers' popularity illustrates
how rabble-rousing and clout-chasing political punditry can be monetized, in reality the
disinformation ecosystem goes deeper than those mainstream media have branded as
“purveyors of fake news”. In the Philippines’ competitive disinformation economies, other kinds
of micro-influencers have also stepped in to compete for clout and profitable collaborations (see
Authors 2019).
This paper focuses on the rise of “pseudonymous influencers” and situates them as important,
but underreported, disinformation agents that pollute the media ecosystem. Pseudonymous
influencers are those innocent-looking parody accounts, humorous meme pages, and romantic
love quotes (aka. hugot) accounts that occasionally slip in paid content for their political clients.
While they might not have the same capacities to shape political conversation as a “fake news

queen” or traditional celebrity, pseudonymous influencers play a unique role in the
disinformation economy as their media manipulation strategies are not confined to the narrow
frame of “disinformation” or obvious falsehoods that could be corrected by factcheckers. Pseudonymous influencers’ media manipulations instead take advantage of regulatory
loopholes in election campaigns and campaign finance laws. They use humorous language or
horny thirsttrap selfies to cloak political messages and even inflammatory speech. They are also
able to maintain anonymity that helps them evade both creative industry regulations and official
investigations.
Engaging broader debates about the political economy of disinformation (Briant, 2021; Feldstein,
2021) and contributing a global South case study, our analysis demonstrates that fact-checking
initiatives with narrow remits in defining and correcting disinformation must evolve to better
respond to local features of disinformation production. What is needed in Southeast Asian
countries such as the Philippines are creative and collaborative interventions that can engage
private industries as well as promote transparency and accountability in practices of influencer
marketing and political campaigning. Researchers and legal experts should collaborate and
strategize for local regulatory reform in the promotional industries rather than simply lobby
Facebook or Twitter for more or better content moderation of “fake news”.
Finally, our paper contributes to disinformation studies by nuancing how pseudonymous
influencers in a personality-based political system test the boundaries of the frame
“disinformation”. This has far-reaching consequences as these controversial, if not necessarily
obviously disinformative, tactics were also used in the failed Democratic presidential campaign
of Michael Bloomberg in the US (Tiffany, 2020). His campaign assembled armies of social media
influencers and meme accounts and raised questions about the professional ethics of
campaigning as well as the regulatory grey areas in campaign finance. Several meme pages that
Bloomberg enlisted used fake quotes from Bernie Sanders, but the humorous delivery of meme
accounts were not as egregiously manipulative as other scandalous tactics in the US election
cycle, such as the use of conspiracy theory (Collins, 2021). We argue the media manipulation
strategies of pseudonymous influencers have really flown under the radar of disinformation
interventions and indeed we need a “whole of society approach” to tackle the issue (Friedberg &
Donovan, 2018). The anonymous nature of these accounts is also worth critical reflection: new
top-down legislation in the Philippines and other countries in the global South have pivoted
toward banning, censoring, and penalizing anonymous accounts on social media with no
consideration of the actual content of their pages. Human rights groups such as Article 19 have
cautioned that overly punitive legislation threatens users' privacy, freedom of expression, and
non-discrimination (Article 19, 2022).
Context and Methods
This article draws primarily from a collaborative project we conducted during the 2019
Philippines elections, where we monitored social media conversations and tracked
disinformation narratives using digital ethnography between December 2018 and May 2019. Our
project was specifically interested in the disinformation agents and media manipulation

techniques underreported in mainstream media and escaping the fact-checking interventions
that dominate the Philippines’ disinformation mitigation space. Together with a larger team of
researchers, we observed a range of news pages on various platforms and influencer accounts
on Instagram and Twitter. This paper specifically compiles our insights about the pseudonymous
influencers we observed, though we also catalogued a more diverse range of mega- and microinfluencers (see Ong, Tapsell, & Curato, 2019). The broader project made use of mixed methods
of qualitative online observations, big data analysis, and interviews with digital campaign
strategists to capture evolving trends in election campaigning that include official “aboveground” political advertising and marketing as well as black ops campaigning incorporating
disinformation and smear campaigns.
At the same time, this paper is informed by long-term ethnographic research on disinformation
economies in the Philippines that involved interviews with the range of campaign strategists,
influencers, and fake account operators active in digital political campaigns in the 2016
Philippines elections (Ong & Cabanes, 2018; 2019). This original research project was informed
by a production studies approach examining the work arrangements and moral justifications of
workers behind digital campaigns. This earlier project uncovered the very early use of
pseudonymous influencers behind the worldwide trending hashtag #NasaanAngPangulo
(“Where Is the President?”) smearing the reputation of then-President Benigno Aquino III and
spotlighting his absence during a monumental crisis event, as we will discuss further below. As a
paper that synthesizes insights from two election cycles and crisis events happening between
campaign periods, we are able to present a typology of the diverse genres of pseudonymous
influencers involved in the political process that should inform researchers and policymakers
trying to mitigate social media manipulation at scale.
The Pseudonymous Influencer Ecosystem
Influencer is a marketing term used to refer to individuals with a large number of online followers
acting as “micro-celebrities” in digital environments (Abidin, 2016). We characterize
pseudonymous influencers as part of the influencer economy in the sense that they capitalize on
their smaller yet equally fervent organic followers (from 50,000 to 2,000,000 followers). Like
other digital influencers, pseudonymous influencers get paid for promoting different commercial
brands (Ong & Cabanes, 2018). However, unlike the microcelebrity influencers who are known
to capitalize on their “textual and visual narration of their personal lives and lifestyles” (Abidin,
2016, p. 3), pseudonymous influencers operate successfully without disclosing names and
identities of their actual operators. As we discuss below, the same way that pseudoanonymous
influence operations leverage their anonymity to appropriate marginalized identities and use
inflammatory speech (Friedberg & Donovan, 2018), it is also the anonymity of pseudonymous
influencer accounts help them evade industry regulations and serve different political patrons.
This section maps out a diverse ecology of pseudonymous influencers classified to different
genres of social media performance and media manipulation strategies: a) Pinoy Pop Culture
Accounts, 2) Parody Accounts, and 3) Horny “Alt” Accounts. The typology presented is based on
the characteristics of these accounts and the usual contents they post to appeal to and sustain

their online audience. By citing examples of disinformation, hate speech, and conspiracy theory
seeded by these pseudonymous influencers, we demonstrate how their strategic use of local
popular vernaculars and “gutter languages” is able to maneuver diverse grey areas around
acceptable speech on platforms.
1. Pinoy Pop Culture Accounts
Pinoy pop culture accounts adopt pseudo personas such as a stereotypical middle-class auntie
(e.g., @TitasofManila, or Aunties of Manila), a wise adviser on love and failed romances (e.g.,
@BobOngQuotes, @hugotquotes), and fictional television villains known for their bitchy (and
occasionally misogynist and classist) one-liners (@SenyoraSantibanez). These accounts comment
on Filipino society and culture at large and can reach mega-influencer status of having millions of
followers because of their broad masa (mass or mainstream) appeal. For instance, Senyora
makes fun of herself as a “flat-chested” woman and many of her posts poke fun at well-endowed
celebrities and influencers, pushing the boundary of acceptable humor with Filipino gender
stereotypes.
Operating mostly on Facebook and Twitter, their media manipulation includes slipping paid posts
for their corporate and political clients in between their stream of inspirational or humorous
posts. Organized systematically, a team of them can work together and coordinate the tweeting
of hashtag according to set schedules in an effort to game the Twitter trending rankings, or more
specifically, to secure the top rank in trending topics in order to catch the public’s attention.
We first observed this coordinated behavior on Twitter for #NasaanAngPangulo (trans.
#WhereIsThePresident) during the Mamasapano Crisis way back in January 2015, which sought
to shame President Benigno (Noynoy) Aquino for his absence in the public spotlight in the
immediate aftermath of the death of 44 Special Action Force personnel from a failed military
operation (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. @TheBobOngQuote originated the hashtag #NasaanAngPangulo which trended
worldwide on Twitter, and picked up by local and global media outlets.
The account @TheBobOngQuote is operated anonymously. The pseudo's persona is that of a
wiser old man dispensing generic inspirational quotes. The hashtag #NasaanAngPangulo trended
both locally and internationally; both local and international news media outlets such as the BBC
picked up the story and reported heavily on Filipino Twitter publics' anger at an “absentee
President” (BBC Trending, 2015). In our analysis of social media discourse, we observed
@TheBobOngQuote account worked alongside other Pinoy pop culture accounts in a
coordinated fashion and helped shape broader public discussions about the country's need for a
populist strongman leader instead of an elite politician. After all, Aquino represented the elite
establishment, and his eventual successor Rodrigo Duterte is the angry populist strongman who
promised to deliver results during a crisis (Arguelles, 2021). In our ethnographic interviews with
campaign strategists (Ong & Cabanes, 2018), one PR consultant took credit for being the brains
behind the #NasaanAngPangulo influence ops and revealed she "activated" her usual
collaborators–a group of younger people operating multiple pseudo accounts–during the crisis.
Gaming Twitter trending rankings is a service she has historically offered to corporate clients, and
now being rolled out to political clients.

During our 2019 elections monitoring, we observed similar techniques of assembling
pseudonymous influencers this time to promote campaign slogans for politicians. The most
successful hashtag boosting was for Imee Marcos’ election campaign slogan #IMEEsolusyon,
which reached the Top 10 Trending hashtags on Twitter.
In many ways, pseudonymous influencers’ media manipulation strategies enact Alice Marwick
and Rebecca Lewis’ (2017) concept of attention hacking, which they described as a media
manipulation technique employed by US far-right groups that sneak extreme ideas into
mainstream media coverage. Attention hackers exploit journalists’ predilection to cover
newsworthy controversy such as viral and trending topics on Twitter. Our case study here
illustrates how innocent-looking pseudonymous influencers similarly hack media and public
attention through seeding hashtags for their political clients. In this case, the local attention
hackers' practice of gaming Twitter trending topics is primarily driven by corporate marketing
logics rather than driven by political beliefs or position (for more on the advertising and PR
disinformation work model, see Ong & Cabanes, 2019). As Lee Edwards (2021) argued, PR firms
uses disinformation “by constructing their meaning in ways that protect professional interests”
(p. 177) but at the same time damages the quality of political debate. This is why pseudo accounts
can also be inconsistent with their political positions and loyalties – their allegiances can shift and
their services can be sold to their client of the moment.
Take for example the case of Pinoy pop culture influencers formally enlisted as “endorsers” of
politicians (Figure 2). Senyora Santibañez, a mega-influencer with over 4.5 million Facebook
followers, endorsed reelectionist Senator Nancy Binay months before the start of the 2019
election campaign season. Prior to this engagement, this account, best known for her snarky
takedowns and classist comments on the poor and the working-class, had actually bullied Binay
and her family for having dark skin–a racist and classist jibe in postcolonial Philippines where fair
skin color is a marker of high status. This is an example of how a politician pays out a powerful
influencer to silence their racist and classist bullying, and instead direct their operations to
support their political campaigns. In this regard, pseudonymous influencers can be very
opportunistic in their political transactions.

Figure 2. In this post, Senyora pokes fun at her physical absence at the book launch of her coauthored joke book with Nancy Binay. Ironically, this account had once bullied Binay and this
staged collaboration officially ended their feud and helped reverse the tide of incessant
racist/classist bullying of Senator Binay.
2. Parody Accounts
Unlike Pinoy pop culture accounts whose political loyalties can be more discreet unless activated
in an official endorsement, parody accounts tend to be obviously supportive or antagonistic
toward the politicians or government offices they impersonate.
Parody accounts (such as @NoynoyingAquino, @Korinavirus, and @AltPhilMedia) employ vulgar
language when criticizing elite establishment personalities and "elite" mainstream media. They
attack politicians for being too elitist or lacking political will during times of crisis. Sometimes,
they poke fun at specific facial features or personality traits of politicians, such as when
@NoynoyingAquino used vulgar humor to call former President Benigno Aquino III mentally
abnormal–riffing off an old and very offensive joke that the President looks like a mentally
handicapped person.
In this example below (Figure 3), @NoynoyingAquino attacked Aquino and fellow Liberal Party
ally current Vice President Leni Robredo, bullied their supporters as “abnormal” (or mentally
handicapped), and praised the Duterte administration.

Figure 3. A political parody account of former President Benigno Aquino III praised the Duterte
administration and attacked his supporters.
Meanwhile, anti-Duterte parody accounts—such as Malacañang Events and Catering Services,
and the Superficial Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines (parodying official government
offices)—use the language of satire and humor to challenge Duterte and his allied authority
figures. Rhetorically, parody can be strategically used to poke fun at the excesses and
shamelessness of those in power. Sometimes, a target of their parody is how Duterte claims at
being a “strongman” politician while actually being cozy with the Chinese government (Shiga &
Kawase, 2021).
At times, these parody accounts critical of the Duterte government slipped into racist expressions
against Chinese people. For instance, the Malacañang Catering Events and Services account
poked fun of Duterte and his close relationship with Xi Jinping, acknowledging how the country
is an inch closer to being “a province of China”. Other accounts used explicitly racist and crass
language. The political parody account Pulitikanginamo (Figure 4) regularly referred to Chinese
people with the racial slur “ching chong”. On one occasion, the account misleadingly shared a
photo of a Chinese toddler defecating in public though the incident did not actually occur in a
Philippines mall. The page called Chinese tourists “dog eaters” and invited its followers to submit
memes mocking them. This page has since been taken down by Facebook after our research team
published our study that discussed the use of racist narratives as a political weapon in the 2019
election (see also: Silverman, Lytyvenko & Kang 2019).

Figure 4. Trans. “Son of a Bitch, these Ching Chongs are so disgusting [profanity]! The beach was
closed for months to be cleaned and you’ll just make it dirty! You should be banned, you sons of
bitches! You’re not the only tourists in the world! You sons of bitches you dog eaters! Fuck you!
Get out, Ching Chong!” Screenshot by the authors.
Like the meme pages in Abidin’s study (2018), pseudonymous influencers can pivot their content
during crisis events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and remain relevant and influential. As
shown in examples below (Figure 5), pseudonymous influencers were similarly responsible for
mixing up conspiracy theory, medical misinformation, and anti-Chinese hate speech in the
Philippines when fears of the virus and its origins took hold. The country has long been victim to
Beijing’s territorial encroachments into contested regions of the West Philippine Sea (Ong, 2021;
Tantuco, 2021).

Figure 5. A discussion between two pseudo accounts discussing the conspiracy theory that the
COVID-19 virus was intentionally leaked from the Wuhan Lab in China.
These conspiracy theories are clear examples of what Abidin (2018) describes as “decisionseeding discourses” that can be expressed in extreme ways by pseudonymous posters and meme
pages, while politicians advanced this same narrative in their own official statements in more
“moderate” and less inflammatory tones (for more on anti-Chinese racism in Southeast Asia, see
Ong, 2021).
What is critical to highlight here is how pseudonymous influencers’ media manipulation
strategies of using anti-China narratives for political gain could lead to everyday racism and hate,
as Chinese migrant workers have been tagged on social media like in Figures 5 and 6 as carriers
of the virus and agents of the Chinese government. While these accounts position these racist

expressions as pockets of resistance whereby they assert that Philippines is the primary victim of
Chinese territorial aggressions and it is important that more Filipinos expose and resist political
and everyday indignities, these expressions could pose significant threats to multicultural social
relations in the country.
3. Horny “Alt” Porn Accounts
Unlike other platforms with stricter rules around nudity and X-rated content, Twitter has become
an “amateur porn paradise” for gay men to experiment with “alter” (i.e., alter ego) personas who
are sexually liberated and expressive of their innermost desires. “Alter” accounts in Philippines’
Gay Twitter might still act more discreetly than Gay Twitter in the US (Abad-Santos, 2021) as
many horny Filipino gay men still hide their faces and adopt pseudonyms to post sexual content,
flirt with other “alters”, and deep dive into specific sexual genres such as intergenerational or
interracial sex. Some “alters” offer paid subscription services on amateur porn sites such as
OnlyFans and JustForFans (Cao, 2021). With the popularity of “alters” or "alts" on the rise, some
have taken advantage of their huge and passionate fan following for political persuasion.
In the pandemic moment where many have been sexually frustrated locked down at home as
well as frustrated the Duterte government’s militarized pandemic response, we observed some
“alt” porn accounts breaking from their homemade sex video production for political
commentary (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Alt Account 1 (pseudonym) is an ‘alt’ who shares sexually suggestive content and
occasionally participates in political commentary. Here he mixes anti-government commentary
#OustDuterteNow and support for LGBTQ equality with #TiteNaSumabog (#EjaculatingPenis) to
appeal to a very specific demographic of “woke” horny gay men.
In Figure 7, we see a similar practice of mixing horny hashtags (#jakol or #masturbate) with a
clear anti-Duterte political position. Not only does this help boost the visibility of antigovernment voices in the context of a repressive regime, it also connects the alter with other gay
men belonging to a minority political camp. As pro-government online trolls and state officials
have silenced dissent through digital harassment as well as “redtagging” (insinuating that
government critics are Communist sympathizers), maintaining pseudo identities such as alters
should be seen as a strategic expression of activism to evade state-sponsored trolling and
harassment. We observe alters such as one trans female account (see Figure 8) using Twitter to
highlight government abuses as well as criticizing politically apathetic fellow citizens.

Figure 7. Alt Account 2 shares their thirst trap photo with hashtags #jakol (#masturbate),
#alterph, #OustDuterte, and #OUSTDUTERTENOW as a form of political signaling within their
specific community.

Figure 8. Alt Account 3 is a trans alter account who mixes pornographic content with political
criticism.
Alter accounts are liberated in both sexual and emotional expressions. We have not gathered
material evidence from research interviews that any of the "alt" accounts are formally enlisted
as part of paid influence operations, though it is possible that their operators might maintain
other meme pages.
However, in 2019 we had observed how non-X-rated sexy shirtless men's Instagram pages were
activated to repost the official campaign materials for an old male Senator, ostensibly used to
micro-target Filipino LGBTQ+ voters (Ong, Tapsell, & Curato, 2019). This is the most concrete

evidence to date that at least one politician and their political PR team has considered that sexy
gay male influencers can arouse a niche voter demographic.

Understanding Local Features of Disinformation to Inform Global Disinformation Interventions
Thus far, this paper takes a broader view of disinformation shadow economies in the Philippines
and spotlights the media manipulation strategies of pseudonymous influencers that appear
entertaining and innocent while evading responsibility for stoking racism and seeding crisis
narratives. Pseudonymous influencers are not the disinformation agents most egregiously
responsible for blatantly false news or the most aggressive and inflammatory speech. However,
we have shown examples how they have occasionally used humor, parody, and horniness to
cloak blatantly racist, classist, sexist, or ableist speech.
At the same time, this paper exposes the limits of the frame “disinformation” when we discuss
the influence operations at play and their many proximities to inauthentic coordinative behavior,
racial targeting and harassment, “black” campaigning, and attention hacking. As we have shown,
pseudonymous influencers can pivot during crisis events such as COVID-19 and seed "decisionmaking frames". What this means is that pseudonymous influencers’ media manipulation have
agility and maneuverability to survive and thrive in a sophisticated disinformation economy
where platforms, journalists, and fact-checkers focus their energies catching a select few
“purveyors of fake news” but overlooking those enacting subtler and savvier influence
operations. This is particularly problematic as platforms’ content moderation has been
notoriously slow to understand cultural nuances of local humor or niche subcultures. In our
experiences when engaging with platforms, their takedown policies are best suited to
deplatforming accounts that use specific words, such as racial slurs like “ching chong”, as
discussed above.
Moving forward, we are particularly worried about how these accounts will continue to exploit
regulatory loopholes. We observe a lot of momentum behind spotlighting platform
accountability in the West, where specific discussions about Silicon Valley platforms’
responsibility to deplatform political elites have advanced significantly from previous policies
(Zuckerman, 2021). However, the accountability of private industry with the diversity of
disinformation-for-hire or influence-for-hire actors lacks steam. It is important that future
interventions expand from fact-checking and reporting on false news on social media to include
PR firms, advertising agencies, and influencer agencies’ responsibility and accountability in the
disinformation debate (Briant, 2021; Edwards, 2021). At the same time, civil society groups
should resist top-down legislation that caricature all pseudonymous accounts or anonymous
accounts as the source of "fake news", which some worrying legislation that aims to empower
law enforcement to go after anonymous accounts (Article 19, 2022). What is needed are
transparency and accountability frameworks rather than overbroad top-down legislation that
expands government control and surveillance. In any case, this study has presented granular
evidence to show how the thriving influencer industries in a global South context are very much
complicit and creative in being enlisted as pawns and artillery for political elites' game of thrones.

At the same, because of the anonymous nature of these same accounts, they can be easily
scapegoated and targeted by dangerous legislation.
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